LI NETWORK
An observation was made by the Supreme Court on how ‘malice’ wasn’t grounds to challenge a legislative law.
The bench consisting of Justices RF Nariman, Navin Sinha, and KM Joseph made this observation while passing a judgment and stood by the constitutional validation of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act 2020’s Sections 3, 4, and 10.
The court addressed the petitioners’ contention of the amendment being created to pander to the real estate lobby and to succumb to the pressure they added or to placate their vested interests.
The bench stated that an argument such as this is ‘a thinly disguised attempt at questioning the law of the Legislature based on malice‘. It also stated:
“A law is made by a body of elected representatives of the people. When they act in their legislative capacity, what is being rolled out is ordinary law. Should the same legislators sit to amend the Constitution, they would be acting as members of the Constituent Assembly.
Whether it is ordinary legislation or an amendment to the Constitution, the activity is one of making the law. While malice may furnish aground in an appropriate case to veto administrative action it is trite that malice does not furnish a ground to attack a plenary law.”
They also mentioned this with regards given to the cases of K. Nagaraj and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another as well as, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Narain Singh.
The court further mentioned that a legislature of supreme nature can’t be cribbed, cabined or even confined by the promissory estoppel doctrine or just through estoppel.
“It acts as a sovereign body. The theory of promissory estoppel, on the one hand, has witnessed an incredible trajectory of growth but it is incontestable that it serves as an effective deterrent to prevent injustice from a Government or its agencies which seek to resile from a representation made by them, without just cause.”
The bench made the observation on the ground that plenary law could be challenged as well. The justices stated that a legislative law could be challenged in a successful manner despite the division of powers if one among the Parliament and the State Legislature “usurps power” that doesn’t fall under the domain 57. Then such a law would be rendered incompetent.
If a law breached the constitutional provisions of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed to all citizens as stated in the Constitution’s Part III, then it would be declared null to its contravention’s extent.
And of course, any law within the Constitution’s Article 19 would continue to remain valid for non-citizens as well. Lastly, besides the Fundamental Rights, the Constitution’s supremacy apart from the legislation of ordinary nature even when it’s plenary in nature, will remain preserved with the perspective that said legislation must fall within the Constitution’s provisions.
They also further stated that plenary legislation can be challenged if it was found to be manifesting arbitrarily. Another ground that they recognised with reference to the case of Shreya Singhal v Union of India, was that even if a law was the offspring of the Legislature it mustn’t be vague since this would be considered an opposition to Article 14.
These judgments were stated as a part of the case of Manish Kumar v. Union of India and others as well as, with regards to other connected cases.
