Debangana Ray
Published on July 3, 2022 at 19:32 IST
The Apex court reiterated that the mere acceptance of the rent by the landlord does not lead to the waiver of termination of the lease.
In a suit, filed the landlord for eviction, the tenant contended that there was no valid termination of tenancy as per Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.The Trial court accepted the contention and dismissed the suit.
The plaintiff or the landlord filed a revision petition which was accepted under Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Cause Courts Act by the Karnataka High Court.
It held that in view of Section 111(a) of the Act, the lease would be determined by the flow of time and under such circumstances, a Notice of termination under Section 106 of the act is not required.
The court focused on the judgement of Shanti Prasad Devi and Anr. V Shankar
Mahto, and stated that mere acceptance of the landlord after the expiry of the period of lease would not amount to the waiver of lease.
Therefore, the defendant approached the Apex Court by filing a special leave petition.
The Apex court bench comprising of Justices CT Ravikumar and Sudhanshu Dhulia stated that, “In view of the evidence thus obtained and taking into account the decision in Shanti Prasad Devi’s case (supra) the High Court held that mere acceptance of the rent by the landlord after the expiry of the period of lease would not amount to waiver of the termination of lease.”
“Relying on a Division Bench decision of the High Court in M.C. Mohammed Vs. Smt. Gowramma rendered relying on the decision in Pooran Chand Vs. Motilal & Ors., held that on expiry of the term fixed under the deed the tenant would not be entitled to statutory notice under Section 106 of the TP Act.”
“It was found that on determination of the lease by efflux of time no further termination of the tenancy by issuing a statutory notice to bring termination of a lease already terminated is necessary.”
Dismissing the Special Leave Petition, the bench held that the judgment and decree of the Civil Court was not ‘according to law,’ and therefore the High Court was certainly within its rights to set aside the decree in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.