By Tanishka Tiwari

Published on: October 17, 2023 at 14:45 IST

Human rights are a commonly acknowledged and recognized notion in the twenty-first century. The abolition of racial discrimination, the independence of many countries from colonial authority, and the expansion of democracy, human dignity, and fundamental rights have all established the groundwork for human rights.

When the world watched two World Wars, the atomic bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, child enslavement in the Lord’s Resistance Army, and transgender battles worldwide for their identity and respect, the value of human rights were recognised. Though human rights may be seen in the 1215 Magna Carta, they were widely recognised and approved in 1948 through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

States were now accountable for defending and preserving every citizen’s human rights. However, a legal document such as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act has always been at odds with its scope and discretionary ability to fire at or use other force to protect public order, even if it results in death.

The Act achieves the reverse of its goal, making people’s lives unpleasant, insecure, and unsafe. Furthermore, the statute protects Army troops from any criminal punishment. It was claimed that including such a provision in the act to keep peace and social order was a clear breach of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.¹

The Armed Forces Special Powers Act was passed to preserve public order and ensure the affected region’s inhabitants’ safety and security. Since its inception, it has been claimed that Army members have abused the authority and responsibilities bestowed upon them, resulting in human rights violations.

With changes in the country’s socio-political landscape, numerous states elevated the applicability of the AFSPA Act in the states. For example, Punjab and Chandigarh repealed AFSPA in 1983, while Tripura just repealed the AFSPA Act from the states. There is still much dispute over the Act’s application in other states because it infringes on the Human Rights of the citizens who live there. It was claimed that they constantly abused the arbitrary authority granted to the military forces.

In this article, the author analyses the AFSPA Act 1958 and its applicability in contemporary India. Also, this article overviews the Manipur violence of 2023 as a case study to understand when the AFSPA Act can be enforced.

About AFSPA

The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), enacted in 1958, has been a contentious statute criticised by many segments of the society since its passage. This statute grants anyone serving in the military unrestricted authority to shoot and kill anybody they believe poses a threat in any way.

Its origins may be traced back to the Lord Linlithgow Ordinance 1942, adopted to quell the Quit India movement. Nagaland was one of the first former republics to desire independence from India. Following this, the government enacted AFSPA, a legislation used by the British to stifle the movement of the struggle for freedom. As a result, many Indians were killed and imprisoned, and many families were devastated.

AFSPA is similar to other colonial laws imposed and enforced on the people before independence. It is now much more arbitrary than it was previously because the ability to shoot was previously granted exclusively to officers with the rank of captain before independence in 1942. However, it is now extended to non-commissioned officers, making it arbitrary.

The AFSPA Act was required to allow the military forces to keep the peace and suppress unrest in the northeast. This Act grants the military forces broad capabilities, including dealing with domestic security situations. This Act is only used in locations where conventional legislation and local police are insufficient to prevent insurgents. According to Article 355 of the Indian Constitution,² the Central Government must defend the states from “external aggression and internal disturbance.”

The AFSPA helps the Central Government to carry out its constitutional responsibilities. The AFSPA was initially implemented in Assam and Manipur. It was passed to deter the Naga tribes from causing disturbance.

The Act established a legislative framework that granted the military forces exceptional capabilities to restore peace and order in troubled areas. This Act was subsequently revised multiple times to broaden its reach.

The Act was revised in 1972 to include the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Tripura, and Nagaland. Furthermore, the 1972 Act gave the Central and State Governments the authority to declare a region a disturbed area. The Act was then extended to Punjab and Chandigarh with the passage of the Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act in 1983. It was in effect in Punjab and Chandigarh for over 14 years before being repealed in 1997. Following that, the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990 expanded the Act’s authority to include the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Act enabled the military forces to cope successfully with the region’s insurgency.

The Act grants the military forces extraordinary capabilities to preserve law and order in troubled areas. Sections 4³ and 5⁴ grant broad authority to the armed forces. It includes the ability to arrest, conduct search and seizure operations, and demolish assault or training camps used by armed insurgents. The military forces have the authority to employ force to the point of death.

The Act also grants legal protection to personnel of the armed services who act or appear to act under the Act. The provisions of the Act appear to coexist with the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as the rules of the Code are observed in conducting search and seizure operations and other activities authorised by the Act. Section 5 of the Act protects the individual arrested under the AFSPA. Anyone apprehended under the Act must be transported to the nearest police station immediately. In addition, a report on the arrest circumstances must be returned to the police station.

Numerous writ petitions were filed in Peoples Union For Human Rights v. Union Of India⁵ contesting the proclamation providing for the execution of AFSPA in Assam. The Court supplied a list of districts to whom the relevant notification would apply and asked the administration to evaluate the notification monthly.

The Court further ordered that anyone detained under the Act be transferred to the police station immediately and brought before the nearest magistrate within 24 hours. Furthermore, only individuals who have committed or are suspected of committing a cognizable offence may be arrested.

Meaning of “Disturbed Area”

In Section 2(b),⁶ the term “disturbed area” is defined. This Section defines a disturbed area as one that has been notified under Section 3⁷, which states that the Central Government or the Governor or Administrator of the State or Union Territory, as the case may be, may declare the entire state or union territory to be a disturbed region. An area may be declared disturbed if the Central Government or Governor determines it is problematic that the armed forces must intervene to protect residents.

The decision of the Governor under Section 3 of the AFSPA Act was challenged before the Delhi High Court in the matter of Inderjit Barua v. State of Assam.⁸ The Guwahati High Court first filed the cases, which the Delhi High Court considered since both the Union and State governments preferred transfer petitions before the Supreme Court. While upholding the Governor’s actions, the Court made the following remarks:

• The AFSPA would only apply to a region for as long as the scenario described in Section 3 persisted. The powers of the Act would expire whenever the circumstances returned to normal, and the proclamation was revoked.
• Regarding the meaning of “disturbed area,” the court stated that it refers to an area devoid of peace and tranquillity. The Court noted that this phrase has been used in various statutes and that it is unnecessary to define it expressly since the statement may have different meanings in sensitive and nonsensitive areas.
• It is the responsibility of the state to protect the civil people and their property. The State has the authority to employ justifiable force to carry out its responsibilities. The Act is based on this power but should not be abused.
• While the Governor has the authority to declare an area a disturbed area, this authority should not be used arbitrarily.
• When an area is declared disturbed without any rational basis or justification, or when such a declaration is fanciful, it fails the test of arbitrariness and violates Article 21 because it is not deemed a declaration made by the legal procedure.
• When a person is determined to violate the law and order, he must be warned before employing force.

Powers of armed forces under the AFSPA Act

Section 4 addresses the military forces’ specific powers in a troubled region. This Section grants a commissioned or non-commissioned officer, warrant officer, or officer of comparable rank extraordinary authority. They have the following powers under this Section:

• The armed forces have the authority to prevent an assembly of five or more persons.
• Furthermore, carrying weapons, ammunition, guns, or explosive chemicals is illegal in a troubled region. The armed forces may open fire or use force, even if it means killing anybody who is detected carrying such things.
• The armed forces have the authority to demolish any weapons dump, position, or shelter that will likely be utilised for or from which assaults are launched. Furthermore, the troops may demolish any structure used for concealment by armed fugitives, gangs, or armed volunteers.
• The military forces have the authority to arrest without a warrant any individual who has committed or is suspected of committing a cognizable offence. To make such an arrest, the police may use whatever force is required. Without a warrant, the forces may also enter and search any premises to effect such an arrest.
• The forces have the authority to search any place without a warrant to rescue a person illegally detained, retrieve stolen property or items reasonably thought to be stolen, or recover illicit weaponry, explosives, or explosive chemicals.

The petitioner’s son had driven over a 13-year-old kid and attempted to flee in the landmark case of Harendra Kumar Deka v. State of Assam and Ors.⁹ There were six other people in the car. Following the collision, a crowd chased the petitioner’s son, and to escape, he drove the car at a high speed. The police signalled him to halt at the first checkpoint, but the dead did not. He also failed to stop at the second checkpoint and struck a police officer on the third signal. Following that, the officer fired at the car, intending to hit the wheels. However, they hit the petitioner’s child, who died due to his injuries.

In the case, the Court made the following observations:

• The Court stated that the armed forces may use lethal force only if they believe it is essential to maintain public order and after warning the individual about using such deadly force. Furthermore, lethal force may only be used against those in any action prohibited by Section 4(a).¹⁰

• Section 6¹¹ does not grant complete immunity. Where an act of the armed forces does not strictly follow the authorities provided by the Act, the Central Government must give its approval so that legal action can be taken against the defaulting members.
• About Article 21, the Court said that no one can be deprived of his life unless in line with a legally specified procedure.
• While every organised state must regulate insurgent, terrorist, and extremist activities, the Court said that the State could not go beyond lawful authorities.
• The Court recognised that police officers were not members of the “armed forces” as defined in the Act and hence were not entitled to the protection provided.
• Furthermore, while the police had the power to use force to achieve the arrest, the degree of force employed was unwarranted since they had no basis to suspect that the vehicle driving was an extremist or a member of any extremist organisation.

An inquiry into 1528 false encounters was urged in a writ petition in the case of Extra-Judicial Execution Victim Families Assn. v. Union of India.¹² The petitioner claimed that filing writ petitions in the High Court, filing FIRs, or filing complaints with the Human Rights Commission had yet to result in any meaningful redress.

The Attorney General argued that the inquiry in some of the instances should not be reopened due to the passage of time since the occurrences happened. The Court, however, ruled that the government must have investigated such occurrences when they happened. Furthermore, the Attorney General requested that no procedures be filed when the next of kin had not petitioned the court.

The Court, on the other hand, determined that the petitioner was promoting the collective public interest of all the petitions. Finally, the Attorney General argued that the procedures should not be commenced because proper monetary compensation was given to the deceased’s relatives. The Court ruled that compensation was intended to alleviate the pain caused by the death of a family member. It could not be used to override legal processes.

As a result, the Court ordered the formation of a Special Investigation Team (SIT). Because the Attorney General questioned the impartiality of the Manipur police, the Court ordered the CBI to probe the claims of fake encounters. The Court also advised all states to establish a State Human Rights Commission for liberty, justice, and human rights.

Special Safeguards under the AFSPA Act

Section 6 of the Act states that no one acting or claiming to act in the exercise of powers conferred by the Act may be prosecuted or tried in a suit or other legal proceedings without the prior consent of the Central Government. This assures no legal procedures against the military services are initiated based on false and unsubstantiated charges.

The legality of the AFSPA Act was challenged before the Apex Court’s Constitutional Bench in Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India.¹³ The question of whether Parliament had the authority to enact such legislation emerged. The Court ruled:

• The Court decided that Parliament was competent to pass such legislation and that the Act was legitimate.
• According to Article 355, the Union is obligated to protect a state from both internal turmoil and external assault.
• The deployment of military forces will not replace the state’s civil power but will supplement it.
• The designation of a disturbed area under Section 3 must be evaluated every six months.
• A Central Act conferring the right to declare under Section 3 on the Central Government does not violate the Constitution’s federal framework.
• Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution are not broken by Sections 4 and 5. The armed forces shall use “minimal force” when arresting under Section 4.

• When a person is detained under Section 4(c),¹⁴ he shall be handed over to the official in charge of the local police station as soon as possible.
• Within 24 hours of arrest, such a person must appear before a Magistrate.
• The Code of Criminal Procedure must be observed while performing searches and seizures within the authority granted by Section 4(d).
• The army authorities would provide a list of do’s and don’ts that the troops must adhere to when executing Section 4 powers.
• Finally, Section 6 of the Act, which requires the Central Government’s authorisation to prosecute an armed forces member operating under this Act, is not arbitrary. However, the government’s unwillingness to impose such a punishment can be challenged in court.

Five persons believed to be terrorists were confronted in the Army Headquarters v. CBI case.¹⁵ The CBI investigated the case and produced a charge sheet. The Army also examined the case under the terms of the Army Act. The Union contended that the Court lacked the authority to take the chargesheet on record without the approval of the government, as required by Section 7 of the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990 (which is similar to Section 6 of AFSPA). Conversely, the CBI said that the troops’ actions were not part of their official duties and hence did not require government approval.

According to Section 7 of the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990, the Court decided that the Central Government’s approval is required. Such sanction must be acquired before filing the charge sheet with the criminal court. The Court determined that the demand for sanction arose when taking cognizance, not during the inquiry. The charge papers were thus returned to the CBI. The Court ruled that if legal actions are launched without following the obligatory conditions of Section 7, the proceedings will be void. However, under the Army Act, prior sanction is not necessary for situations of court-martial.

AFSPA Act and International Conventions

India has signed various international treaties, particularly human rights. In April 1979, India ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 6 of the Covenant states that everyone has an “inherent right to life” that cannot be taken away arbitrarily. However, under Section 4 of the Act, the armed forces can use force and kill troublesome elements depending on their judgement.

According to Article 7 of the Covenant, no one should be subjected to cruel, inhumane, or humiliating treatment or punishment. It is frequently claimed that the AFSPA contains harsh punishments and consequently breaches Article 7 of the Covenant. Article 4 of the Covenant states that a State may choose not to meet its commitments under the Covenant in an emergency.

Debate on AFSPA

AFSPA became contentious in the history of the war in Jammu & Kashmir after previous Acts had created the groundwork for contesting their execution due to legal gaps and human rights abuses. Certain parts of the J&K Public Safety Act 1978 might be construed to benefit the police.

Persons acting against the safety of the state or law and order are frequently held for up to two years and without charges for at least one year under the Act. The Act was also revised to exempt information concerning the arrest from being disclosed to the inmate. Similarly, the Terrorist and Disruptive (Prevention) Act 1987 (TADA) has been challenged due to the definition of disruptive acts, which may violate the constitutional right to free expression.

The ICJ has made the same observation about AFSPA: the conceivable employment of soldiers in “disturbed areas” to repress political activities cannot be justified. The issues of dispute surrounding the AFSPA discussion are being examined in the context of the more significant conflict in the Kashmir region.

AFSPA has been exposed to judicial examination and reviews throughout its lengthy existence to bring it closer to ensuring human rights protection. As a consequence, the Act has been wholly whetted. These committees have also proposed ways to promote openness while ensuring troops’ ability to perform in complicated war circumstances is not hampered.

Justice Reddy Committee 2005

The committee was formed after Manorama Devi died in custody in Manipur in July 2004. The committee was charged with amending AFSPA to defend human rights and exchanging it with a more humanitarian statute if necessary. The committee published its findings in June 2005, after considerable research and analysis of the problem in talks with members of civil society such as people, groups, the legal fraternity, and tribal groupings, as well as the military within the state and at the central level. It was claimed that the overwhelming desire of the people was to retain the army but with appropriate reforms within the legal systems, that is, to establish an environment for troops to operate against extremists without endangering people’s rights.

In doing so, the committee concluded that the existing Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) 1967, with certain modifications, could provide the troops with the necessary protection. The committee cited that UAPA was meant to combat terrorism, has identified acts and organisations involved in terrorism, has built-in protection for troops and paramilitaries, and is applicable across India. It also advised the formation of grievance cells comprised of local government representatives, the military, and hence the police. The Justice Reddy committee was chastised for being regressive; although urging the abolition of AFSPA, it recommended special powers under the UAPA. It may be breaching human rights again but under the garb of another statute.

Justice Hegde Commission 2013

The panel was established by the Supreme Court after inquiries into extrajudicial executions in Manipur from 1978 to 2010 were requested. It was mandated to review the role of the security forces inside the state; thus, the commission openly interviewed members of civil society, gathered documented evidence, and thus the testimony of various personnel of the security forces. It stated that the safety forces’ investigations were insufficient and that the use of force was essential. It also pushed for strengthening the police forces, discovered to be under-trained to deal with insurrection within the state to get rid of the military. It also admitted to a disproportionate use of gunfire despite failing to capture the accused. In the context of insurgent activities, the Justice Hegde Commission was deemed impractical. Top military leaders largely share such viewpoints. The fundamental problem is expecting employees in extremely dangerous and life-threatening situations to be prepared to utilise non-lethal force.

Justice Verma Committee 2013

This Committee is being addressed separately since it does not directly impact AFSPA but has commented on it. Following the gang rape and murder of a woman in Delhi in December 2012, the government formed the Justice Verma Committee to investigate sexual abuse legislation. Comments about sexual crimes perpetrated in conflict zones were included in the report. According to it, the AFSPA legitimised sexual assaults. It was suggested that military services be prosecuted under regular legal codes and that staff training and supervision be re-oriented to address the issue of sexual transgressions.

The Justice Verma Committee report has been criticised for misstating facts and failing to take into account existing rules and regulations within the soldiers, which treat any type of sexual abuse offence with the utmost seriousness and thus initiate the strictest disciplinary action against the offender. Similarly, erroneous factual understanding of military deployment in insurgent operations has been questioned, as has insufficient and factually wrong awareness of quick judicial procedure inside the army. Aside from the review above, the Supreme Court has affirmed the AFSPA’s constitutional legitimacy, finding that the powers granted to troops are not arbitrary or inappropriate.

Manipur Violence 2023: A Case Study on the Enforcement of AFSPA

The conflict has enveloped the northeastern state of Manipur for several months. Violence, displacement, loss of life, livelihood, and property have left any sense of normalcy obsolete since early May. Nagaland borders Manipur to the north, Mizoram to the south, and Assam to the west. It also shares two volatile Myanmar areas: the Sagaing Region, primarily inhabited by Bamar (Burmans), who reside in the dry zone regions and along the Ayeyarwady River to the east, and the Chin State to the south. The name ‘Chin’ was initially used by the Burmese in Myanmar to refer to all hill tribes on Myanmar’s western border. However, in Manipur, the hill tribes are separated into two groups: the Chin-Kuki and the Naga.

A segment of the Meitei community has advocated for inclusion on India’s Scheduled Tribe Lists, citing the benefits of specific land rights and protection, economic packages, job possibilities, and other benefits. As they continued their quest for ST designation, the Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Government of India, issued a letter on May 29, 2013, addressed to the Government of Manipur, asking it to submit “a specific recommendation along with the most recent socio-economic survey and ethnographic report.” Because the Manipur government did not answer, a writ suit was filed before the Manipur High Court.

The High Court of Manipur, in a judgement dated March 27, 2023, instructed the Manipur government to provide a proposal to the Ministry of Tribal Affairs on Meitei’s claim for inclusion on the Schedule Tribes List. The All-Tribal Students’ Union, Manipur (ATSUM), an association of Kuki ethnicity, disagreed with the High Court judgement and planned a protest march, inviting numerous tribal organisations to join. ATSUM arranged a “Tribal Solidarity March” in all hill districts of Manipur on May 3, 2023, with the theme “Come now, let us reason together.” Indigenous Tribal Leaders’ Forum (ITLF), Joint Co-Ordination Committee on Tribal Rights Manipur (JCCOTR-M), and others supported it.

The march of ATSUM incensed many Meitei who sought ST designation, believing it to be the sole way to economic advancement, preventing land transfer to immigrants/foreigners, and defending Manipur’s integrity. As a result, Meitei pro-ST activists arranged a “counter-protest” in the border districts of Churachandpur and Bishnupur. ATSUM’s protest march was effective in Kuki-dominated areas of Manipur, notably in Churchandpur town. However, Churachandpur had not yet withdrawn the restriction order issued by the district administration on April 27 under Section 144 of the CrPC on May 3.

The events in Manipur after May 3 and the following weeks have been quite concerning. numerous Kuki-Zomi and Meitei villages were burned down, and numerous purported engagements between Manipuri State Police commandos and Kuki-Zomi rebel groups were reported. According to the CM, 40 terrorists were killed, and numerous others were apprehended in operations and engagements throughout the Imphal Valley’s foothills, where the Kuki-Zomi and Meitei factions intersect. The army refused to confirm these encounters, claiming that the continuing insurgency did not cause the violence and that it was a law and order issue that could only be handled politically.

Insurgent groups covered by the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement with the government of India and the state administration have denied any involvement in the violence neither in attacks on civilians nor shootouts with Manipur police forces. However, they suggested that “village volunteers” who defended their communities and land against aggression or attacks “have been affected” and may be engaged. This continuous bloodshed creates a dangerous precedent, delaying peace discussions and settlement negotiations for decades.

The Kuki National Organisations (KNO), an umbrella organisation for several Kuki rebel groups in this area, have stated their desire to continue peace discussions with the Centre. However, the nature and content of these talks may vary.

The involvement of these insurgent organisations in any type of violence, as claimed by the Biren Singh-led Manipur administration, will undoubtedly impact these groups at the bargaining table. In exchange for a halt to the insurgency, the SoO agreement safeguards rebel groups from action by Indian or state security forces. The Biren Singh administration withdrew from the pact in March 2023, a decision not recognised by the Centre or the military services, who are also signatories to the deal.

The Meitei political establishment blames the violence entirely on specific segments of the Kuki community for supporting illegal poppy cultivation as well as providing shelter and protection to unlawful Myanmarese Kuki refugees who have entered the Churachandpur district in search of a larger Kuki homeland within the state of Manipur. Conversely, the Kuki leaders claim that the latest war was caused by the Manipur government’s relentless attacks on the Kuki-Zomi people to release protected tribal territory.

The Meiteis have previously been forced out by the Kuki-Zomi population on the outskirts of the Imphal Valley. At the same time, the Kuki-Zomis have been driven out by the Meiteis in Imphal. Meiteis from villages bordering Kuki-Zomi territory have fled to the Imphal Valley, and the departure has been completed by the Kuki-Zomi tribes, who have left the Valley for the Kuki-dominated Churachandpur district.

To control the situation, the army immediately moved several forces, nearly 200 columns, from neighbouring Arunachal, where they were deployed along the Indo-China LAC, and the Manipur government immediately imposed a curfew under CrPC section 144 in several districts and suspended mobile phone data services for five days in the late afternoon.

However, video clips, images, and messages/information/rumours about killing, wounding, raping, plundering, kidnapping, burning, or demolishing communities had already gone viral on social media. It fueled the already simmering communal hatred against one of the groups, which had been building for a few years. The Manipur government has halted internet broadband services and allowed the civil authorities to kill individuals who break the law.

On a half-yearly basis, the Manipur government extended the application of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) throughout the state, except for 19 police stations in seven districts in the Imphal Valley.

Due to a “significant improvement” in the security situation, AFSPA has been gradually phased out throughout the valley districts occupied by the Meitei population since 2022.

The State government’s announcement preserving the “status quo” is effective as of October 1. It comes despite the army’s desire that AFSPA be reinstated in the valley areas, claiming that its absence impeded operations against rebel groups. During the current surge of ethnic violence, these groups are claimed to have acquired a foothold in the state after a long calm.

Conclusion

The AFSPA was enacted even after colonial control ended to safeguard the country from adversaries and anti-national movements. But, to date, has the Act been enacted for that purpose? The list of crimes and cruel behaviours done by the armed services has shattered records throughout the years. Instead of safeguarding the country’s people, it has been mercilessly exploiting them.

Even while it has effectively prevented uprisings and adversaries from penetrating the country, it has also become a reason to welcome the fury of the nation’s people and give birth to bigger anti-national upheavals. So, what has to be done is to maintain a close eye on the authorities, modify the laws, and impose harsh penalties for such acts. It is also critical to limit the unconditional authority of the Armed Forces and to give the Supreme Court a larger role in achieving justice.

References

• Living with Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) as everyday life
• AFSPA and Human Right Violation
• AFSPA Application in Manipur
• The Critical Review of AFSPA
• Study of AFSPA in assam, Nagaland, J&k
• AFSPA the debate

• afspa-armed-forces-special-powers-act/
• fspa-extended-in-manipur-for-6-months-from-october-1-barring-19-police-stations-of-valley
• the-crisis-in-manipur-an-assessment/
• Explained: Irom Sharmila and her struggle against AFSPA s
• Shodhganga : a reservoir of Indian theses @ INFLIBNET
• What is Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, and where is it in force?
• India Legal: Latest Law News, Latest India Legal News, Legal News India, Supreme Court Updates, High Courts Updates, Daily Legal Updates India (indialegallive.com)
• 10_chapter 5.pdf (inflibnet.ac.in)
• A Never-Ending Nightmare in Kashmir (thewire.in)
• AFSPA to remain till Naga issue is resolved: Nagaland CM Rio – EastMojo
• AFSPA removed from Meghalaya after 27 years
• 25 years of AFSPA in J&K demonstrates a failure of accountability, claims Amnesty (scroll.in)

Endnotes

1. Constitution of India, 1949, Art.21

2. Constitution of India, 1949, Art.355

3. Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, s.4, No.28, Acts of Parliament, 1958 (India)

4. Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, s.4, No.28, Acts of Parliament, 1958 (India)

5. AIR 1992 Gau 23

6. Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, s.2(b), No.28, Acts of Parliament, 1958 (India)

7. Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, s.3, No.28, Acts of Parliament, 1958 (India)

8. AIR 1983 Delhi 513

9. (2009) 2 GLR 263

10. Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, s.4(a), No.28, Acts of Parliament, 1958 (India)

11. Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, s.6, No.28, Acts of Parliament, 1958 (India)

12. (2017) 8 SCC 417

13. AIR 1998 SC 431

14. Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, s.4(c), No.28, Acts of Parliament, 1958 (India)

15. (2012) 6 SCC 228

Also Read: Armed Forces Special Power Act – An Analysis