Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate
Published on: 05 May 2023 at 11:34 IST
While commendably granting relief to a woman judicial officer facing charges of ‘recklessness’ in passing a judgment of acquittal, the Patna High Court in a learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Sangeeta Rani vs The State of Bihar and Ors in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 5617 of 2022 that was pronounced as recently as on April 17, 2023 held that, “Putting a Judicial Officer to a departmental proceeding for a wrong order does not serve as a panacea for any ill which is being faced by the judiciary or for that matter any department of the Government. In fact, reckless proceeding only lowers the morale of the judiciary.”
It must be mentioned here that while quashing the major punishment of compulsory retirement imposed upon her, the Division Bench of Hon’ble Mr Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Hon’ble Mr Justice Harish Kumar directed its administration for her immediate reinstatement. We thus see that the punishment was modified by directing for withholding of three increments of pay with cumulative effect.
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Ashutosh Kumar for a Division Bench of the Patna High Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Justice Harish Kumar sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “Heard Mr. Jitendra Singh, the learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Harsh Singh, for the petitioner, a Judicial Officer, Mr. Piyush Lall for the High Court and Mr. Suman Kumar Jha for the State.”
To put things in perspective, the Division Bench envisages in para 2 that, “The writ petitioner/Judicial Officer, while being posted as Sub Judge XIV-cum-A.C.J.M., Patna in the year 2016, passed a judgment of acquittal in a case instituted under Section 138 of the Negotiable instruments Act, 1881 (in short the N.I. Act), which led to the setting up of a departmental proceeding against her for having acquitted the accused for extraneous consideration and not relying on the materials on record for coming to her conclusion.”
As it turned out, the Division Bench discloses in para 3 that, “The departmental proceeding ended in the inquiry authority having concluded a serious lapse on the part of the proceedee, which was indicative of no proper verification or consideration of records/evidence, implying grave negligence and, in turn, leading to the only inference of not having shown absolute integrity and devotion to duty,”.
“The officer was found to have depicted lack of judicial fairness which is unbecoming of a Judicial Officer which conclusion was accepted by the disciplinary authority and she was subjected to the penalty of compulsory retirement in terms of Rule 11 (ix) contained in Part-V of the Bihar Judicial Service (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 2020.”
To be sure, the Division Bench then states in para 4 that, “The afore-noted decision of the disciplinary authority has been affirmed by the Standing Committee of the Patna High Court.”
As we see, the Division Bench then enunciates in para 12 that, “In her (the petitioner/proceedee/Judicial Officer) Court, there was tremendous work load and therefore she could not find out that the records were not available as it had gone in the Copying Department,”.
“The Enquiry Officer, therefore, noted that Exhibits-1 to 4 were complete in itself so far as evidence with respect to dishonour of a cheque was concerned and, therefore, her missing out on such details while pronouncing judgment could not have been a bona fide mistake. The plea of the proceedee that those documents were sent to the Copying Department is not correct as those documents were sent to the Copying Department only on the date when the judgment was pronounced,”.
“Nonetheless, the depiction of the exhibits on record would clearly give an idea that such important documents, forming the bedrock of the accusation of dishonour of cheque, were available on record.”
Truth be told, the Division Bench then observes in para 13 that, “The Enquiry Officer appears to have gone a bit further while deciding about the accusation of extraneous consideration. He went through the allegation petition filed by the Advocate for the complainant. But he could discern no allegation on that count in the deposition of witnesses in the proceeding,”.
“There was no remark about the integrity of the Judicial Officer or her general reputation by the witnesses. The conclusion of the Enquiry Officer is that notwithstanding that there is no direct evidence and material to show that there was any extraneous reason for delivering erroneous judgment but it could be presumed indirectly that such judgment could not have been passed without unfair reasons,”.
“This was termed as falsification of facts. The reckless misconduct on the part of the proceedee, while discharging her judicial duties, reflected gross negligence which could be likened with misconduct.”
As an inevitable fallout, the Division Bench then states in para 14 that, “Based on the aforesaid report of the Enquiry Officer, the proceedee was subjected to the punishment of compulsory retirement with nothing payable to her except subsistence allowance for the period that she had spent under suspension.”
While citing the relevant case law, the Division Bench mentions in para 26 that, “In fact, the Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra Singh Vs. High Court of Allahabad; (2007) 4 SCC 247 has specifically disapproved the practice of initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the Officers of subordinate judiciary merely because the judgments/orders passed by them are wrong. The logic behind such verdict is that the appellate and revisional Courts have been established to rectify the mistakes committed by the Judge of the first jurisdiction. For taking disciplinary action based on judicial orders, extra care and caution is required.”
On a related note, the Division Bench then while citing another relevant case law states in para 27 that, “Similarly, in Krishna Prasad Verma (dead) through legal representatives Vs. The State of Bihar and Ors.; 2019 SCC On-Line SC 1330, the provisions contained in Article 235 of the Constitution of India has been referred to through which the High Courts control the subordinate Courts,”.
“A High Court, therefore, ought not to take action against the Judicial Officer only because a wrong order has been passed. Nobody can claim that he has never ever erred in his life. Though one has to guard against corruption in judicial office, but it cannot be done only by identifying wrong judgments/orders passed by the Judges.”
Most significantly, the Division Bench then minces absolutely no words to hold in para 28 that, “We do not subscribe to the view that if wrong judgments/orders are passed, there should be no disciplinary action, but such action should be initiated only if there is definite and pointed evidence that the wrong judgment/order has been passed for extraneous reasons and considerations and not because of the reasons which are available in the file of a case,”.
“Jumping to the conclusion of corruption and corrupt practice at every wrong judgment/order or unsustainable judgment/order that one comes across, is not going to serve the purpose. Putting a Judicial Officer to a departmental proceeding for a wrong order does not serve as a panacea for any ill which is being faced by judiciary or for that matter any department of the Government. In fact, reckless proceeding only lowers the moral of the judiciary. [refer to Neelam Sinha Vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. (C.W.J.C. No. 1780 of 2015) disposed off on 13.03.2023.).”
Do note, the Division Bench notes in para 29 that, “In the instant case, we have found that there is a solitary charge against the Judicial Officer of having recorded a verdict of not guilty in a complaint case, relating to an offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881. Prima facie, the records reveal that necessary documents in support of the prosecution were available on record.”
Simply put, the Division Bench unequivocally states in para 30 that, “The petitioner as a Judicial Officer cannot be permitted to say that those documents could not be noticed while pronouncing the judgment for any reasons whatsoever. The acquittal in this case was highly unmerited; but the question before us is whether such unmerited acquittal amounted to falsification of the records by ignoring to consider the documents on record.”
It would be instructive to note that the Division Bench then notes in para 31 that, “On a careful consideration of the totality of the circumstances, we are inclined to give benefit of doubt to the petitioner as a Judicial Officer, who might well have passed an order in a hurry. Many a times, such orders do reflect a motive of helping the accused which in turn could be without any unjust consideration, but that cannot be taken as the sole motivating factor in all cases where the judgments do not pass the test of constitutionality and legality, facts, law or otherwise.”
Be it noted, the Division Bench notes in para 32 that, “For our own satisfaction, we have gone through the materials which have been exhibited at the instance of the Judicial Officer, though under protest, by the disciplinary authority, that never in the past, the Officer had been charged with anything to be desired regarding her integrity,”.
“This was a solitary instance and not a repeated case of such unmerited acquittals. Even if it is assumed that the lapse was reckless, it would still be a venial lapse. Lest we may not be misunderstood and taken amiss, we clarify that a Judicial Officer has to guard against many such peccadilloes while dispensing with the judicial function but for a solitary act of recklessness, it would be unjust to the Judicial Officer to be shown the door at such an early stage in service.”
As a corollary, the Division Bench propounds in para 33 that, “We, therefore, are not in agreement with the final outcome of the departmental proceeding of the petitioner. The punishment awarded to her is much too harsh even for the recklessness having been exhibited by her as a Judicial Officer.”
On a different note, the Division Bench expounds in para 35 that, “Compulsory retirement is one of the major punishments provided under the Rules in a departmental proceeding in which fixing the quantum of punishment is within the discretion of the disciplinary authority,”.
“However, for such decision to be sustained, the sentence should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. If the choice of sentence imposed on a proceedee is way disproportionate to the charge, such a decision could be questioned on grounds of proportionality, which by now has become an inherent part of the concept of judicial review.”
Quite aptly, the Division Bench then hastens to add in para 36 stating that, “In the words of Lord Diplock in R Vs. Goldstein; (1983) 1 All E.R. 434, such disproportionate punishment would be like “using a sledge-hammer to crack a nut”.”
Most remarkably, the Division Bench holds in para 40 that, “After having given anxious consideration over such suggestion, we find that doing so it would only be counter productive as the petitioner is a Judicial Officer, who would again be subjected to such rigors unnecessarily when there does not require any other evidence to prove that the judgment of acquittal was totally unmerited. To prove that there was extraneous consideration behind such unmerited acquittal would require a revisit of the entire charge before a disciplinary authority, which is neither warranted nor necessary, as it was a solitary instance which has been reported.”
Most rationally, the Division Bench then directs in para 41 that, “Thus, exercising our powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, we set aside the decision of compulsory retiring the petitioner and modify the sentence by directing for withholding of three increments of pay with cumulative effect.”
In addition, the Division Bench also directs in para 42 that, “The petitioner should immediately but be inducted in the service.”
For sake of clarity, the Division Bench clarifies in para 43 that, “The petitioner, however, shall not be paid for the period that she remained out of service. Needless to state that the continuity with respect to her service shall be maintained.”
Finally, the Division Bench concludes by holding in para 44 that, “The writ petition stands allowed to the extent indicated above.”
In sum, we thus see quite distinctly that the Patna High Court has made it indubitably clear that a Judge may be subjected to disciplinary action for wrong judgment only if there is “definite evidence” of extraneous considerations. In this leading case we saw how the Patna High Court by exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution quashed the major punishment of compulsory retirement that was imposed on the petitioner who was a Judge while modifying the punishment by directing for the withholding of the three increments of pay with cumulative effect.