Shashwati Chowdhury
Published on: August 19, 2022 at 19:17 IST
The Supreme Court stated that a complaint over a bounced check that is filed before the period of 15 days following the date of receipt of notice by the drawer of the cheque is not maintainable.
In this case, the accused received the notice on November 8, 2005, and the complaint was filed on November 22, 2005, before the fifteen days had passed. The accused was acquitted by the trial court. However, the High Court accepted the complainant’s appeal and found the accused convicted.
The following issue was raised before the Apex Court and was up for consideration: Can an offence punishable under Section 138 of the aforementioned Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, be adjudicated on the basis of a complaint made before the 15-day deadline specified in the notice that must be served to the cheque’s drawer in accordance with Section 138(c) of that Act?
The three-judge Bench that answered this in Yogendra Pratap Singh v. Savitri Pandey (2014) 10 SCC 713 meant that the issue was no longer res integra, as noted by the Bench consisting of Justices DY Chandrachud and AS Bopanna.
When the court applied this law to the facts of this case, it found that the complaint was filed on November 22, 2005, when it should have been on November 23, 2005.
Another issue that arose was whether the complainant would be permitted to resubmit the complaint despite the fact that the one-month deadline set forth in Section 142(b) for making such a complaint had passed. The Bench took note that this issue had also been addressed in Yogendra Pratap (above), and the following decision had been made:
“His remedy is only to file a fresh complaint; and if the same could not be filed within the time prescribed under Section 142(b), his recourse is to seek the benefit of the proviso, satisfying the court of sufficient cause. Question (ii) is answered accordingly.”
While setting aside the High Court order, the court noted that the complainant is free to file a new complaint. It further stated that the would be free to seek the benefit of the proviso by satisfying the trial court of reasonable cause for the delay in bringing the complaint because the previous complaint could not be brought within the time frame required by Section 142(b) of the NI Act.