LI Network
Published on: 14 July 2023 at 13:40 IST
The Allahabad High Court stated on Wednesday that the accused had knowledge and intention to cause bodily harm to the deceased, but did not intend to kill the deceased. Therefore, the case falls under Exceptions 1 and 4 to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
The case was brought before the bench of Justices Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker and Umesh Chandra Sharma, who were dealing with an appeal challenging the judgment and order passed by an Additional Sessions Judge registered under various sections of the IPC.
In this particular case, Geeta Devi, the daughter of the informant, was married to Tinku after giving a dowry. However, Geeta Devi’s husband’s family started quarrelling with her over dowry and also threatened her.
She informed the informant about the mistreatment, cruelty, and denial of food by her in-laws. One day, the informant received information that his daughter had been burnt by her in-laws.
The question before the bench was whether the appellant’s conviction under Section 302 of the IPC should be upheld or whether the conviction should be converted under Section 304 Part-1 or Part-ll of the IPC.
The bench referred to the case of Lakhan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, where the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of dying declaration, which is based on the legal maxim “nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire” (a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth), is enshrined in Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
This doctrine is an exception to the general rule that oral evidence must be the testimony of a witness who claims to have seen it (Section 60 of the Evidence Act).
A dying declaration is a statement made by a person who cannot be called as a witness and therefore cannot be cross-examined. Such statements are considered relevant facts in certain cases.
The High Court observed that if it concludes that the dying declaration is true, reliable, recorded by a person when the deceased was physically and mentally capable of making the statement, and not made under any coercion or prompting, it can be the sole basis for a conviction. In such cases, no corroboration is required.
The bench noted that it is not an absolute principle of law that a dying declaration cannot be the sole basis for the conviction of an accused when the declaration is true, reliable, and recorded in accordance with established practice and principles.
In this case, the witnesses and authorities involved in recording the dying declaration did not turn hostile and fully supported the prosecution’s case. The dying declaration was deemed reliable, truthful, and voluntarily made by the deceased.
Therefore, the dying declaration can be acted upon without corroboration and can be the sole basis for conviction. The trial court was justified in relying on the dying declaration and convicting the accused-appellants based on it.