Shivdeo Singh & Ors. v.s State of Punjab & Ors.

Shivdeo Singh & Ors.

v.s

State of Punjab & Ors.

Appellants- Shivdeo Singh & Ors.

Respondents- State of Punjab & Ors.

Decided On: 08.02.1961

Bench:

1. B.P. Sinha (CJ)
2. S.K. Das
3. A.K. Sarkar
4. N.R. Ayyangar
5. J.R. Mudholkar

Statutes Referred:

1. Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950
2. Constitution of India

Facts:

1. This is an appeal special leave from the decision of the Punjab High Court dismissing an appeal under the Letters Patent against the judgment of Gosain J. in a writ petition.
2. At the beginning of the year 1950, a number of displaced persons were allotted with certain agricultural lands in the Bhaini Bangar village (District- Gurdaspur) on a quasi-permanent basis, adhering to the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 and the rules made thereunder.
3. In the month of July of the same year, the village was given the status of on that is “fauji” by the declaration of the same, by the Director of Rehabilitation (Rural), Jullunder. It was further stated that the land therein would have to be reallotted.
4. This is what appears from his order dated July 10, 1950 (Ex. C), though, according to the statement of facts in the High Court, the Director of Rehabilitation had actually passed an order canceling the allotment already made in favour of “non- fauji” families.
5. It was an admitted fact that the appellants belonged to the category of “non-fauji” families.
6. An order dated October 9, 1951, was passed by Mr. Vikram Singh (Director of Relief and Rehabilitation, Punjab) which observed, inter alia, that all 27 non-fauji families, that are 2nd-grade land-holders have to move out if the “fauji” character of the village is to be maintained and that the only thing that can be done for them is be fitted in some good 2nd-grade village, for which D.C. Gurdaspur will be asked to find the required area in a suitable village for the outees of Bhaini Bangar. The action however was put on hold until after the result of an appeal which was coming up before the Supreme Court.
7. A writ petition was filed by the appellant before the High Court of Punjab soon after the order took place for the quashing of the same, to which the Director of Rehabilitation alone was made the party.
8. The writ petition was allowed by Khosla J. and eventually, respondents numbered 3-14, being members of “fauji family”, in whose favour either allotment had been made or was intended to be made, preferred a petition before the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for impleading them as parties in the appellants’ petition and rehearing the whole matter.
9. The High Court entertained the petition and Khosla J., allowed it. An appeal before the High Court under the Letters Patent was preferred by the appellants, which, as already stated having been dismissed, they have come up to this Court in appeal by special leave.

Issues:

1. Whether the implementation of the order of Mr. Vikram Singh could be executed subsequent to June 15, 1952.

Contentions of the Parties:

Appellant’s Arguments:

1. Referring to Rules 14(6) and 49 enumerated in the Administration of Evacuee Property (Central) Rules, 1950, it was so contended that the power to cancel an allotment could not be exercised after July 22, 1952 and that in any case the cancellation of allotment made even prior to this date could not be implemented if it was not implemented before June-15, 1952.
2. It was stated by the learned counsel for the appellant that the order passed by Mr. Vikram Singh on 9th October 1951, was not an order of cancellation of allotment at all but was actually in the nature of proposal or at best it was a tentative or an inchoate order.
3. It was further contended that the order dated October 9, was not final.
4. It was finally contended that Art. 226 of the Constitution does not confer any power on the High Court to review its own order and, therefore, the second order of Khosla, J., was without jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi:

1. The word, “likely” qualifies “immediately” and not “ousted” in the order passed by Vikram Singh on October 9, 1951.
2. The appellants had surely accepted the order dated October 9, 1951, themselves, as being a final order, because in the petition filed to the High Court the appellants had asked for its cancellation, owing to which, they cannot be allowed to raise a contention as it clearly contradicts the stand taken by them in the writ petition.
3. The rules contained in the notification of the Punjab Government in Relief and Rehabilitation Department No. 8689-S (Rein) dated August 29, 1951, were repealed by notification No. S. R. O. 1290 dated July 22, 1952, and though R. 49 saved “anything done or any action taken in the exercise of any power conferred by any of the rules”, it was the second proviso to R. 49 which prohibited the implementation of any order made under the repealed rules before May 25, 1952, unless that order was implemented or enforced on or before June 15, 1952. Rule 49 was amended on August 4, 1952 and the second proviso was deleted, meaning that the non-implementation of any order on or before June 15, l952, would not prohibit its implementation on a subsequent date.
4. There is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution of India to prevent a High Court from exercising the power of review, something that inheres in every court of absolute jurisdiction for the pertinent purpose of preventing miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it.

Judgement:

1. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Conclusion:

The appeal was filed with a view to challenging the dismissal of a prior appeal to the High Court, putting forth a series of arguments that would oppose the previous decisions as arrived upon by the High Court. But upon a perusal of the procedural history and the relevant provisions, it was clear that there was nothing wrong with the decisions gathered upon by the High Court resulting in the dismissal of the appeal.