Pulished on: 23 October 2022 at 10:46 IST
Court – Supreme Court of India
Citation – Madhu Limaye v/s State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held that orders framing of charges or refusing discharge are within the purview of the Section 397 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as such orders are neither interlocutory nor final. It is held that High Courts is imbued with inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process or to secure ends of justice.
Para – 16
The correct position of law as laid down in Madhu Limaye (supra), thus, is that orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither interlocutory nor final in nature and are therefore not affected by the bar of Section 397 (2) of CrPC.
That apart, this Court in the above-cited cases has unequivocally acknowledged that the High Court is imbued with inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process or to secure ends of justice having regard to the facts and circumstance of individual cases.
As a caveat it may be stated that the High Court, while exercising its aforestated jurisdiction ought to be circumspect. The discretion vested in the High Court is to be invoked carefully and judiciously for effective and timely administration of criminal justice system.
This Court, nonetheless, does not recommend a complete hands-off approach. Albeit, there should be interference, may be, in exceptional cases, failing which there is likelihood of serious prejudice to the rights of a citizen. For example, when the contents of a complaint or the other purported material on record is a brazen attempt to persecute an innocent person, it becomes imperative upon the Court to prevent the abuse of process of law.
Drafted by – Abhijit Mishra
Key Words – Interlocutory Order, Frame of Charges, Inherent Jurisdiction.