Prof. Chandra Prakash Agarwal V. Chaturbuj Das Parikh and Ors
Citation: 1970 1 SCC 182
Case Type: Civil Appeal
Case No: 2331 of 1968
Appellants: Prof. Chandra Prakash Agarwal
Respondents: Chaturbuj Das Parikh and Ors
Decided On: 18-12-1969
Statues Referred: Constitution of India, Legal Practitioners Act,1879
Case Referred:
- Sengalani Gramani v. Subbayya Nadar
- V.G. Row V. alagiriswamy.
Bench: S.M. Sikri, J.M. Shelat, V. Bhargava, G.K.Mitter and C.A. Vaidialingam, JJ
Facts:
The appellant filed a writ petition for a quo warranto in the Allahabad High Court, challenging the appointment of the respondent as the Judge of the Allahabad High Court, upon the ground that the respondent was not a practising Advocate of the High court although he was enrolled as an Advocate for more than 20 years ago, but was practising in Benaras and not in the High Court itself. Thus contravened the requirement of Article 217(2)(b).The High Court held that the plain reading of the of the provision of the Article 217(2)(b) would reveal that it means only Advocate enrolled in the High court irrespective of whether one practise in the High Court or a Court or Courts subordinate to high Court.
Issue:
Whether the actual practising of the Advocate in the High Court necessary U/A 217(2) (b).
Contentions by Parties-
Appellant’s Arguments:
The expression “an Advocate of a High court” U/A 217(2)(b) meant an Advocate practising actually in the High Court for the required number of years and does not mean the one practising in any Court or Courts subordinate to the High Court.
The language used in Article 233(2) shows that the Constitution has employed different language for different purposes in order to clearly point out the distinction between “an advocate” and “an advocate of a High Court”. While the former mean an Advocate practising in any court subordinate to high court and the latter mean an Advocate practising in the High court.
Judgment:
The Apex Court’s bench comprising of S.M. Sikri, J.M. Shelat, V. Bhargava, G.K.Mitter and C.A. Vaidialingam, JJ, held the following:
Hon’ble court accepted the opinion by Broome, J that the language used in Article 217(2) (b) is plain and incapable of any other interpretation. It simply means that that the person who is enrolled as an Advocate of the High court irrespective of whether he practices in the high court or any other Court subordinate to the High Court.
The contention of the appellant cannot be accepted as would lead to an anomaly while construing Article 124(3), namely that the Advocate of the Supreme Court who has not practised in High Court for a required period would not be eligible for the office of the judge of the Supreme Court. Hence the contention of the appellant failed.
The word “an Advocate” U/A 233(2) against the word “an advocate of High Court” as no significance due to the enforcement of the Advocates act,1961. Section 16 of the Act provides for only two classes of person entitled to practice namely senior advocates and other advocates.
Hon’ble court adopted the same construction as was adopted by the Madras High court with regard to the provision of Article 217(2) (b). And held the views adopted by Broome, J, were correct. The appeal therefore failed and dismissed with cost of one hearing only.
Rule of Law:
Article 217(2)(b) provides for the qualification of a Judge of the High Court, namely:
- He should be the citizen of India.
- Must held judicial office in the territory of India for at least 10 years.
- Must be advocate of a High Court for at least 10 years or two or more such Courts in succession.
Article 233(2) provides that the person not already in the service of the Union or State shall only be eligible for appointment of a district Judge if he has been an advocate or pleader for at least 7 years and also must be recommended by the High Court.
Conclusion:
Construction of the provision of the Constitution along with other statute is one of the noble work of the Supreme Court of India. Ensuring that the basic meaning of the provision is not derailed/nugatory it employs different rule of interpretation of statutes in accordance with the facts and circumstances of the case. The above case is a classic example of it.