By Arryan Mohanty
Published on: May 01, 2022 at 08:11 IST
Introduction
The Evidence Law is regarded as the forum law, which directs and assists the courts in reaching a decision when dealing with a particular case.
A piece of evidence, not to be confused with proof, leads the court to either prove or disprove something.
The Indian Evidence Act of 1872 is an adjective law that specifies the procedures that Indian courts must follow when admitting and deciding the admissibility of evidence presented to them.
In the case of Ram Jas v. Surendra Nath (1980), the essential premise that sets the evidence law in action was stated: “The Law of Evidence is the legislation that does not impact the substantive rights of the parties, but rather strives to facilitate justice for them.”
Mangala Waman Karandikar (D) TR and LRS. vs. Prakash Damodar Ranade
Here, a contract between the Appellant and the Respondent gave rise to the case. Initially, the appellant’s spouse owned and operated Karandikar Brothers, a stationery company.
In 1962, he died prematurely. After his death, the appellant ran the business for a while, but when she realized, she couldn’t continue to operate it, she opted to hand it over to the Respondent for a while.
All of this was outlined in a contract signed on February 7th, 1963. The contract was renewed, and the appellant determined in the 1980s that she could once again operate her husband’s firm and was ready to take the profession.
She served the Respondent with a notice dated December 20, 1980, demanding that the premises be vacated by January 31, 1981.
The Respondent responded that the sale of the business was purely coincidental, and that the relationship was strictly a rent agreement.
The Appellant was aggrieved by the Respondent’s response; therefore, she brought a civil complaint in 1981 at the court of a Joint Civil Judge in Pune’s Junior Division.
In its judgement, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, holding that it was clear from a reading of the contract that the parties intended to transfer the business from the appellant to the respondent, and that the contract was not implied as rent or permission for the respondent to run the firm.
The Supreme Court also decided that relying on Sections 92 and 95’s provision 6 was unnecessary in this case because the document’s value was obvious.
“It is clear from these two parts that the proviso is only used in circumstances when the details of the record cause the investigation to be called into doubt.”
In any instance, when an archive is clear and easy to understand, the caveat is irrelevant. “In this manner, we may say that Section 95 simply extends on proviso 6 of Section 92,” the bench consist of Chief Justice of India NV Ramana, held.
If the opposing perspective is accepted as delivering Section 92 of the Evidence Act, it expands the scope of the proviso beyond the core Section.
The High Court’s interpretation goes against the fundamental principle of legitimate interpretation.
The proof of any oral agreement that would reject, alter, add to, or deduct from its terms is expressly prohibited under Section 92.
If, as the learned judges suggested, oral evidence could be obtained to show that the conditions of the record were truly different from those communicated in that, it would amount to agreeing with the authority to offer evidence to negate or shift those terms, and as a result, it would come dangerously close to Section 92 of the Act.
The bench, which included Judges Surya Kant and Aniruddha Bose, said that “It couldn’t be postulated that the legislature intended to undermine the goal of Section 92 by creating exclusions for that section.”
The Supreme Court overturned the High Court decision and reinstated the trial court ruling for the respondent to hand over the property to the petitioner.
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal and Ors
In the case of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal and Ors, a three-judge bench of Justices Rohinton Fali Nariman, S. Ravindra Bhat, and V. Ramasubramanian observed that it has been a settled legal principle that the Evidence Act prohibits the proof of an electronic record by oral evidence if the requirements set out in Section 65B of the Act are not met.
The Court established a friendly relationship between the Information Technology Act of 2000 and the Indian Evidence Act of 1872, holding that Section 65B of the latter is a complete Code in and of itself, and that the former legislation and the statutory provision of the Evidence Act as legal machinery against technological overpowering.
Anvar PV v. PK Basheer & Ors
In today’s technology-driven world, the case of Anvar PV v. PK Basheer & Ors (2014) is significant because the Supreme Court decided on the admissibility of electronic evidence in a court of law, based on Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
In this case, the Apex Court reversed its earlier ruling in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005), also known as the Parliament Attack case, by interpreting the application of sections 63, 65, and 65B of the Act of 1872.
The three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court comprising of Chief Justice R M Lodha, and Justices Kurian Joseph and Rohinton Fali Nariman made following opinions were issued by remarking that an electronic record as a shred of secondary evidence shall not be accepted before the Court as evidence unless the requisites set forth in Section 65B are met:
- Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, considers electronic documents to constitute documentary evidence.
- Any documented evidence provided in the form of an electronic record before the court under Sections 59 and 65A can only be proven using the procedure outlined in Section 65B.
- The objective of Section 65B of the Evidence Act is to allow electronic forms to be used as supplemental evidence in Indian courts. The Supreme Court went on to say that Section 65B begins with a non-obstinate clause, which is worth noting.
Dr. Sunil Clifford Daniel v. the State of Punjab
In the case of Dr. Sunil Clifford Daniel v. State of Punjab (2012), the Supreme Court of India considered the interplay between Section 162 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
“A statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation done, if reduced to writing, be not signed by the person making it,” according to Section 162(1), which makes it clear that a statement made before the investigating officer must not be signed by the witness giving it.
To put it another way, the witness will not be bound by the remarks he makes in front of the relevant authority.
However, the provision of Section 162(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code will not apply to statements made under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
The Apex Court remarked that while preparing a seizure report under Section 27 of the Act of 1872, the investigating officer is under no need to obtain the initials of an accused in the comments that have been attributed to him.
However, if such initials are obtained, the act will not be considered illegal.
Kalyan Kumar Gogoi v. Ashutosh Agnihotri and Anr.
In the case of Kalyan Kumar Gogoi v. Ashutosh Agnihotri and Anr. (2011), the Supreme Court of India noted the reason why hearsay evidence is not considered significant under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
According to the basics of evidence law, hearsay testimony is inadmissible in a court of law since it is imprecise and unclear by its very nature.
The Court of Law, as part of its observation, established specific boundaries under which hearsay evidence does not have considerable legal weight, namely:
- The duty of the person giving hearsay evidence is nullified, obliterating the goal of the evidence legislation, which requires every piece of evidence submitted in court to be made with responsibility and knowledge on the part of the person providing it.
- This is also because if something else happens, the person could be charged with lying to the court.
- Hearsay evidence dilutes the truth that needs to be given in court, wasting both the court’s and the other party’s time.
- If the courts allow hearsay testimony, it opens the door to fraud, misrepresentation, and undue influence, all of which are unjust to the person against whom the evidence is presented.
Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani
The case of Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani (2003) concerns the scope and application of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as explained by the Supreme Court of India in the following points:
- According to the Apex Court, Section 91 deals with evidence of contract terms, grants, and other dispositions of properties reduced to the form of a document, prohibiting the proof of written contents other than by writing.
- In reality, Section 91 establishes the doctrine of substantive law, which favours recorded evidence over oral evidence.
- As a result, the best evidence rule is also relevant. Because Section 91 imposes restrictions, it’s worth noting that if a third party wants to verify the existence of a contract between two parties that has been documented, the third party can only do so by producing a written contract.
- Section 92 is similar to Section 91 in that it prohibits the identification of oral evidence for the purpose of altering a contract, but the former varies from the latter due to the limitation imposed by Section 92, which is wholly absent in the case of Section 91.
- While Section 91 of the Act of 1872 deals with the burden of proof for the document before the Court, Section 92 is only concerned with the parties to the document.
- Section 91 applies to both bilateral and unilateral documents, but Section 92 exclusively applies to bilateral documents.
Bodh Raj @ Bodha and Ors v. State Of Jammu and Kashmir
As the Supreme Court of India pointed out in the case of Bodh Raj @ Bodha and Ors v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which deals with “How much of information received from accused may be proved,” is nothing more than a proviso to Sections 25 and 26 of the Act (2002).
The question before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the weapon used in the assault, which was discovered on the basis of information provided by the accused in detention, was sufficient to establish the accused’s guilt or not.
In this case, the Court made following observations:
- The purpose of Section 27 is to allow specific elements of the accused’s comments to the police officer to be admitted as evidence in court, whether or not the utterances are confessional or non-confessional.
- The Court went on to say that if the accused utterances are related to the discovery of facts, the ban imposed by Sections 25, and 26 of the Act of 1872 will be overturned.
- In order to sustain the Doctrine of Confirmation, which is at the heart of this provision, the accused’s statements made in custody, which are acceptable under Section 27, must be proved and recorded for the benefit of both the prosecution and the accused.
- The recovery of an object and the finding of facts, as described in Section 27, are two distinct things.
- The nature of the fact revealed in regard to such information determines how much information provided by the accused will be admissible before a court of law under Section 27.
Bhimsha Subanna Pawar v. State of Maharashtra
In the case of Bhimsha Subanna Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (1996), the Bombay High Court considered the conditions in which independent evidence is not available for the Court to proceed with the accused’s conviction.
In this case, the Hon’ble High Court concluded that, in the lack of independent evidence, the Court must carefully evaluate evidence provided by police witnesses, which, if determined to be a reliable source, will serve as the basis for the accused’s conviction.
Thus, where assault weapons were located in accordance with the accused statement and no evidence existed that would demonstrate the police inspector’s enmity toward the accused, it would be justified and safe to believe the inspector’s uncorroborated statement in regard to the weapon discovered.
Conclusion
Section 65 B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which concerns the admissibility of electronic evidence and was incorporated into the statute by the Indian Evidence (Amendment) Act, 2000, has been discussed in a recent line of cases as technology has surpassed human intelligence.
With the Supreme Court of India’s ruling on the admissibility of electronic evidence, which was previously discussed, the importance of evidence law in recent times might be considered.
The aim underlying the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 can only be recognized through important judgements delivered by the judiciary because evidence law is a branch of law that has garnered prominence since time immemorial.
References
explained-supreme-courts-landmark-judgement-on-section-95-indian-evidence-act
state-nct-of-delhi-vs-navjot-sandhu-2005