What is the difference between Union List, State List and Concurrent List?

By Akanksha Sharma

Introduction

The Constitution of India is the Supreme Law governing the country. It frames fundamental principles, procedures, practices, rights, powers and duties of the government. The Constitutional provisions in India on the subject of distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States are defined under several articles and schedules.

The seventh schedule under Article 246 of the Constitution deals with division of powers between the union and the states. It contains three lists Union List, State List and Concurrent List.

The Union List details the subjects on which the Parliament may make laws while, state list details those under the purview of state legislatures. The Concurrent list on the other hand has subjects in which both Parliament and state legislatures have jurisdiction.

However the Constitution provides federal supremacy to Parliament on concurrent list items in case of a conflict.

Difference between Union List, State List and Concurrent List

Union List	State List	Concurrent List
It originally had 97 subjects. Now, it has 100 subjects	It has 61 subjects. Earlier, it had 66 items.	It has 52 subjects enumerated under it.
Centre has exclusive powers to make laws on the subjects mentioned under the Union List of Indian Constitution.	42nd amendment Act 1976 shifted below mentioned five subjects from State list to Concurrent List: Education Forests Protection of wild animals and birds Weights and measures and Administration of justice, constitution and organisation of all courts except the Supreme Court and the High Courts	42nd amendment Act 1976 shifted below mentioned five subjects from State list to Concurrent List: Education Forests Protection of wild animals and birds Weights and measures and Administration of justice, constitution and organisation of all courts except the Supreme Court and the High Courts
The Union List signifies the strong centre as it has more subjects than state list	The laws can be made on the subjects enumerated under the State List of the Indian Constitution exclusively by the State legislatures. However, all these can be done only under ‘Normal Circumstances’.	The concept of ‘Concurrent List’ in the Indian Constitution has been borrowed from the Constitution of Australia
It contains more important subjects than included in any of the two lists	Article 249 gives Parliament the power to legislate concerning a subject enumerated in the State List in the national interest. Parliament can legislate on subjects that are enumerated under the State List on three conditions: When Rajya Sabha passes resolution During a national emergency When two or more states pass a resolution requesting Parliament to legislate on subjects under State List	Central Government and State Government both can make laws on the subjects mentioned under the Concurrent List
Law made by the Parliament on a subject of the Union List can confer powers and impose duties on a state, or authorise the conferring of powers and imposition of duties by the Centre upon a state. There are 15 subjects in the Union List on which Parliament has an exclusive power to levy taxes	The matters of regional and local importance and the matters which permits diversity of interests are specified in the State List	While both Central and State Government can legislate on subjects mentioned under Concurrent List, however in case of any conflict, the law made by the Central Government Prevails
88th Amendment added a new subject in the Union List called ‘taxes on service’.	There are 20 subjects in the State List on which states legislatures have an exclusive power to levy taxes	The matters on which uniformity of legislation throughout the country is desirable but not essential are enumerated in the concurrent list
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction and powers with respect to matters in the Union list can be enlarged by the Parliament.	69th Constitutional Amendment Act of 1991 made special provision in relation to National Capital. Laws cannot be made by Delhi Government on three subjects under State List named as- Public Order, Police and Land	There are 03 subjects in the Concurrent List on which both Central and state governments have the power to levy taxes.
Some of the important subjects under Union List are Defence Army International Relations Ports Railways Highways Communication	Some of the important subjects under State List are Public order Police Public health and sanitation Hospitals and dispensaries Betting and gambling	Some of the important subjects under Concurrent list are Education Forest Trade unions Marriage Adoption Succession

Subjects which are not present in any of the lists mentioned in the Constitution are known as Residuary Subjects. Union Government has the power to make laws on Residuary Subjects. Such Subjects include:-

• Computer software
• E- Commerce etc.

These subjects came into being after the Constitution was created.

Case Laws

• State Bank of India Vs. Santosh Gupta And Anr.^[1]

Constitution of India was superior to that of the Constitution of J&K

The judgement was a path breaking decision wherein the Apex Court of India held that the Constitution of India was superior to that of the Constitution of J & K and secondly that the provision of SARFAESI (Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interests Act, 2002) were applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

• State of West Bengal Vs. Union of India^[2]
• The future stability of our vast country with its unity in diversity depends upon the strict adherence of the federal principals

The Supreme Court observed that as the Indian Constitution accepts the federal concept and distributes the sovereign powers between the coordinate constitutional entitles namely the Union and States.

This concept implies that one cannot encroach upon the governmental function unless the Constitution expressly provides for such interference.

The Court has the Constitutional power and the correlative duty which is difficult and delicate one to prevent encroachment by the Union of State field or vice versa and thus maintain the balance of federation.

• M. Karunanidhi Vs. Union of India^[3]

Central Act will prevail and State Act will become void

Here Supreme Court held that, where the provisions of a Central Act and a State Act in the Concurrent list are fully inconsistent and absolutely irreconcilable, the Central Act will prevail and the State Act will become void in view of the repugnancy.

Why has the Covid 19 pandemic shown the need to shift public health from State List to Concurrent List?

Covid-19 outbreak refocuses need to shift public health from State to Concurrent List; move won’t harm decentralisation but enhance Centre, state coordination.^[4]

Health should be shifted to the Concurrent list under the Constitution, and a developmental finance institution (DFI) dedicated to healthcare investments set up, Fifteenth Finance Commission Chairman N.K. Singh said on Friday, 26 March 2021.^[5]

The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed and exacerbated the friction between the Centre and the States. The evidence has showed up clearly during this Pandemic as Centre sends inspection teams to states without the concurrence of their respective governments, the state – centre debate on the identification of hotspot, and the demand made by states for receiving funds, personal protective equipment kits and testing equipments from Centre to tide them out of this distress.

To successfully clobber a pandemic in a democracy like that of India there should be cooperation between the Centre and State. But the absence of this in India indicates broad fault lines in the constitutional framework, especially in the domain of public health.

In 2005, the Centre enacted the Disaster Management Act (DMA) deriving its powers under entry 23 of List III. The very idea of Concurrent List is to provide for cooperative efforts of centre and states, and therefore, it was a wise decision on the part of centre to not invoke its residuary powers.

With the legislations framed under the entries of the Concurrent List, there is an added obligation on the centre to bestow equal powers and obligations on the States.

The role of DMA is limited and restricted in a disaster like situation in India and hence the powers of centre and states should remain intact as in several entries read with Article 248 of the Constitution [Parliament has exclusive power to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or State List].

Moreover under Section 11 of DMA the national plan to deal with epidemic has to be prepared “in consultation with state governments and other expert bodies in the field of disaster management” which in the present COVID-19 pandemic is missing, by nullifying the role of the states in formulating a common agreeable plan completely.

Section 11 of Disaster Management Act– There shall be a drawn up plan for disaster management for the whole of the country to be called the National Plan.

To enable a welfare-oriented governance framework in line with cooperative federalism, legislative subjects, especially welfare subjects, require both national and state vision. One such experiment of balancing national and regional goals was undertaken in the 42^nd Amendment to the Constitution which enabled a shift of ‘education’ from the State List to the Concurrent List.

While former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s objective behind this amendment may be questionable, some scholars note that the shift of education by recognising a defined role for the Central government and mandating it to cooperatively work with states.

This approach of sharing responsibility between centre and state is not uncommon as it is followed by other commonwealth countries such as Australia and Canada, allowing for shared responsibility on public health.

As in the case of Schneider Vs. The Queen as on 9^th August 1982^[6], the Supreme Court of Canada in 1982 held that health as a subject should not be subjects to specific Constitutional assignments but should be addressed by both federal and provincial legislatures according to the nature and scope of the health problem.

Conclusion

COVID-19 has shown us how the current constitutional framework obstructs cooperative federalism on the subject of public health.

Hence shifting public health from the State List to the Concurrent List would not be antithetical to the concept of decentralisation as it will provide states with a better bargaining power for finances for public health from the centre, and would empower them to hold the Centre responsible for improper disbursement of resources.

In fact one of the major advantages of having a multi-level federal system is the presence of governance structures at the most local levels, which are best placed to deal with emergent crises.

It would also enable states to design localised public health responses while complying with national goals. Through the process of re-shaping the constitutional structure for public health is fraught with political and social challenges.

References

• insightsonindia.com/
• firstpost.com
• epw.in/journal
• vidhilegalpolicy.in

thehindu.com

cleartax.in

1. State Bank of India Vs. Santosh Gupta And Anr. Etc 1980 AIR 1219 ↑
2. State of West Bengal Vs. Union of India 1963 AIR 1241, 1964 SCR (1) 371 ↑
3. M. Karunanidhi Vs. Union of India 1979 AIR 898, 1979 SCR (3) 254 ↑
4. Covid – 19 outbreak refocuses need to shift public health from State to Concurrent List; move wont harm decentralisation but enhance Centre, state coordination, Available at: firstpost.com (Last visited June 29^th 2021) ↑
5. Move heath to Concurrent List, Available at [thehindu.com ] (Last visited June 29^th 2021) ↑
6. Schneider Vs. The Queen S.C.R. 112 ↑